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ABSTRACTIn legal practice, as in other professions, the increasing use of technologies is not new. However, it is generally agreed that the latest round of new technological development, such as AI and big data, has presented, and will continue to present, challenges to the legal profession in a much more profound way. If the legal profession must adapt to technological changes, so must legal education. Technologies in legal education present us with three sets of consid-erations: the adoption and adaptation of technologies to teaching and learning; the study and research of disruptions and other impacts of technologies in society to assist in formulating legal responses to them; and the preparation of future lawyers.This paper first examines the impact of different technologies on legal practice and responses from 
the profession. Upon examining the opportunities and challenges brought about by new technologies, the paper will further discuss how legal education, especially its curricula, might respond to changes and challenges. It is argued that, like the way they adapted to globalisation, legal education and legal practice will meet new technological challenges and, as such, there is no reason to believe that there is not a bright future for legal education and the legal profession.
Keywords – Legal education, Technology, AI, Curriculum, Learning and Teaching, Legal Profession 
Acknowledgments: The original concept of this paper was first presented at the 6th Sino-Australian Law Deans’ Forum in 2018 and, later at 
seminars in China. The author is grateful for the comments, suggestions and questions from colleagues and students at the Forum and the seminars. 
Disclosure statement  – No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
License –  This work is under Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)  https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ 
Suggested citation: Wang, Z.J. 2019. “Between Constancy and Change: Legal Practice and Legal Education in the Age of Technology.” Law in Context, 36 (1): 64-79, 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.26826/law-in-context.v36i1.87
Summary
1. Introduction 
2. Adoption and Application of Technologies in Legal Practice 
2.1 An Overview of Current Practice 
2.2 Impact and Challenges 
3. Challenges to Legal Education
3.1 An Overview
3.2 The Adoption and Application of Technologies in Teaching and Learning
3.3 Regulation of the Use of Technologies, and Opportunities for Legal Research
3.4 Challenges to Legal Education – Technologies and Curriculum Design
4. Concluding Remarks
5. References
Law in context, Vol 36, Issue 1, 2019  2
ISSN: 1839-4183
1. INTRODUCTIONDevelopments in technology in the last few decades have changed the way people communicate, revolutionised business processes and further propelled globalisation. The legal profession, though not generally responding to changes quickly, is increasingly recognising that changes are inevitable. In legal practice, as in other professions, the 
increasing use of technologies to maximise efficiency and productivity and to improve communication is not new. However, the latest round of new technological develop-ments, such as AI and big data, has presented, and will continue to present, challenges to the legal profession in a much more profound way.  Ever since AlphaGo beat a 9-dan professional Go player in March 2016, we have been hearing frequently that 
artificial intelligence (“AI”) is changing everything, the 
doomsday is closing in, and an “AI apocalypse” is perhaps already upon us (Ferose and Pratt 2018)1.   More recently, consultancy group McKinsey has estimated that 22 per cent of a lawyer’s job and 35 per cent of a law clerk’s job can be automated (Winnick 2017). Another report by Deloitte has suggested that 40 per cent of all law jobs are at risk of automation (Deloitte 2016, Krook 2018). Obviously, 
predicting the future in this technological age is difficult, if not impossible, as the Universities Australia (2018) has 
recently conceded that “[t]he economy – and the labour 
market – are changing at breakneck speed. It is impos-sible to predict the full impact of the current structural 
shifts.”2  Nevertheless, research seems to confirm that, at least, between 13 per cent and 23 per cent of lawyers’ tasks could be automated (Law Society of Western Aus-tralia 2017). Although it is agreed that there will not be 
a sudden “big bang” change, it is also suggested that the eventual impact will be radical and pervasive (Susskind and Susskind 2015, p. 231). In fact, as early as 2013, Susskind had predicted that changes to the legal industry would be more radical in 
the next two decades than those in the last two centu-
ries (Susskind 2013, p. xiii)3,  and without much doubt 
the greatest transformation has been brought about by technological innovations (Canick 2014). It should, however, be recognised that, as the Foundation for Young Australians (2017, p. 9) has rightly pointed out, although 
occupations such as lawyering are identified as most likely to be affected by modern technologies,4  automation and globalisation will affect every job. In other words, lawyers are not alone in facing serious challenges brought about by the rapid development of technologies.It may seem alarmist, but it is not unreasonable to ask whether legal practice and, by implication, legal educa-tion, is doomed, as a result of the application of modern technologies. The answer will very much depend on how the legal profession adapts to the new environment, as it is succinctly stated by the Law Society of Western Australia 
(2017, p. 6) that “… the difference between those who will thrive in the future legal profession and those who will struggle will largely revolve around who adapts best to 
technological changes.”If the legal profession must adapt to technological changes, so must legal education. Conversely, how legal education responds to technological development will also determine the future of legal practice in many sig-
nificant ways. 
This paper first examines the impact of technologies on legal practice and responses from the profession. 
Upon this examination, the paper will then discuss how legal education, especially its curricula, might respond to changes brought about by technologies, so as to ensure that future students will not only receive intellectual cultivation but also acquire sophisticated skills that are transferrable and adaptable in the age of technology.   
2. ADOPTION AND APPLICATION OF 
TECHNOLOGIES IN LEGAL PRACTICE 
2.1  OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTISE
Legal practice is generally considered to be a conservative 
profession. However, the huge expansion of legal education 
in the last 30 years or so in Australia and elsewhere means 
1 Of course, 2016 was not the year we began to hear such warnings; we had heard them much earlier. See further discussion below.
2 See also Perlman (2018). For some of the recent predictions, see College of Law (2018), Neuburger (2017), Lat (2017).
3 A second edition of the book was published in 2017. Susskind and Susskind (2015) also extended this study to include all major professions.
4 But it is claimed by some that the legal profession is one of the most disrupted sectors of the consulting industry today. See Fenwich et al. (2014, p. 354).
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fierce competition for business among law firms, big and 
small.5   It is against the backdrop of this competition that the 
adoption of technologies in legal practice becomes inevitable 
(Vogl 2016), despite the fact that the adoption of technologies 
is more likely to reduce the “billable hours” — the essence 
of business for most law firms.
The application of many of the new and emerging tech-
nologies improves economic efficiency and productivity. 
While many of them are replacing the standard and routine 
work of lawyers (especially paralegals and researchers), 
other technologies are assisting in establishing deep insight 
(such as that facilitated by the use of big data) that was not 
available before.6  AI is developing rapidly, making inroads 
into various areas of the traditional legal practice, from as-
sisting in performance of due diligence, to legal writing to 
predicting results.7  
The application of technologies not only leads to changes 
within traditional law firms, but also leads to the emergence of 
the so-called “New Law”, that is, new forms of legal practice 
that are hybrid practice combining elements of traditional law 
firms with new business models made available through the 
use of technologies, including the various online legal services 
and virtual law firms.8  In Australia, a law firm exclusively 
using AI to provide tax and estate law services was launched 
in 2017.9  As such, it has been claimed by some that AI will 
cause the “structural collapse” of law firms and threaten the 
“very existence of the profession”.10  More recently, it has 
been “revealed” that the latest area in which AI outperforms 
humans is in reviewing legal documents (Leary 2017).  In a 
controlled environment resembling how lawyers work, AI 
and 20 lawyers reviewed the same Non-Disclosure Agree-
ments to identify risks associated with the documents. The 
accuracy rate for AI was 94 per cent, whereas the average for 
lawyers was 85 per cent. On average it took 92 minutes for 
the lawyers to review the documents, but AI only required 
26 seconds.11  Similarly, when AI and lawyers were asked to 
predict the success of claims, AI once again beat the lawyers 
by more than 20 per cent, achieving 86 per cent accuracy.12 
The ILTA 2018 Technology Survey reports that all the 
large law firms with more than 700 attorneys which partici-
pated in the survey indicated that they are pursuing AI and 
Machine Learning projects (International Legal Technology 
Association 2018). AI is, however, only one of many modern 
technologies that are being introduced into legal practice. 
Treating technological advancement as one of the greatest 
issues facing the legal profession, the Law Society of Western 
Australia provides the following illustrations: 
New technologies available include cloud computing; elec-
tronic document management systems; artificial intelligence, 
virtual law firms; online dispute resolution; electronic courts 
and electronic filing of court documents; use of social media 
and blockchain — just to name a few.13 
There is little doubt that each of the modern technologies 
will have a major impact on law, legal practice, and the legal 
profession generally, and together their impacts will be mas-
sive.14   At the same time, each of the technologies presents 
5 In Australia, there were only 21,623 legal professionals (including judges, magistrates, barristers, solicitors and legal officers) in 1986. By October 2016, there were 
71,509 practising solicitors in Australia. The 2016 statistics are based on: The Law Society of New South Wales (2017); the 1986 statistics are based on the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 1947-1986 Census of the Commonwealth of Australia (ABS, Canberra) quoted in Anleu (1991).  
6 For an outline of specific activities where technologies are being utilised, see Law Society of New South Wales Commission of Inquiry (2017). For a brief introduction 
of new technologies being used by large Australian law firms, see Moses (2018), Boran (2018), Marr (2018), Ferose and Pratt (2018).
7 See Goodman (2016), Rayo (2017), Donahue (2018). For a detailed examination of AI in four specific areas, see United States Government Accountability Office 
(2018).
8 For a detailed study of the various “virtual” and online legal practices, see Law Society of New South Wales Commission of Inquiry (2017, ch. 3). 
9 The service is called the Artificially Intelligent Legal Information Research Assistant (“Ailira”). See Davis (2017). The Ailira website suggests that it is expanding its 
business scope: https://www.ailira.com/. Virtual law firms were not a new species in legal practice in 2017. See further discussion below.
10 See the various claims referred to in Law Society of Western Australia (2017). 
11 The experiment was conducted by LawGeex, a leading AI contract review platform. See Leary (2017) 
12 The “Case Cruncher Alpha”, conducted in the UK, see Davis (2017). 
13 Law Society of Western Australia (2017). For an excellent and detailed study on the use of technologies and their impact on legal practice, see Fenwich, Kaal and 
Vermeulen (2017). See also Susskind and Susskind (2015, p. 66-71).
14 In addition to a large number of academic studies, two reports by the legal profession are of particular relevance to the understanding of the impact of technologies 
on legal practice, the legal profession and legal education in Australia: Law Society of Western Australia (2017) and Law Society of New South Wales Commission of 
Inquiry (2017) FLIP Report. Outside Australia, see American Bar Association Commission on the Future of Legal Services (2016). It should, however, be pointed out 
that there are also dissenting views that believe that such talk about disruption of the legal industry by technologies is significantly exaggerated, see Vogl (2016).
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different challenges that legal practitioners must address, 
ranging from the protection of clients’ confidential informa-
tion to privacy protection (especially in cases of breaches 
of network security), from automated interpretation of data 
to lawyers’ ethical obligations in assessing such interpreta-
tions, and from allowing public access to big data to “legal 
services” provided by non-lawyers in the use of law-related 
AI tools (Law Society of New South Wales Commission of 
Inquiry 2017,  FLIP Report).
It would be wrong to assume that technologies only or 
mainly affect legal practice in its narrow meaning. Courts and 
tribunals are equally under pressure to change, to adopt and to 
utilise technologies, and to “modernise” themselves. Indeed, 
we are witnessing paperless trials, online dispute resolution, 
e-filing, e-Court, e-discovery, and many other e-practices as 
part of the formal court processes.15  In the United States, 
using algorithms to assess the likelihood of recidivism or 
rehabilitation has been adopted to assist judges in sentencing 
for many years (Monahan and Skeem 2015). Needless to say 
that technologies are also increasingly applied by government 
agencies to automate certain decision-making.16  
2.2 IMPACT AND CHALLENGES     
As already mentioned, among all modern technologies, 
AI has currently presented the deepest and most profound 
impact on law, legal practice and legal education.17  The 
impact of AI is far more than improving efficiency and pro-
ductivity: AI has the potential to replace lawyers in many of 
the traditional areas of practice, and indeed, it is generally 
agreed that AI can be more accurate and efficient in tasks 
demanding high technical skills.18  As such, the advance-
ment of AI technologies and their application can be seen as 
threatening jobs and opportunities. This is especially so if AI 
is examined from a developing perspective: at the moment, 
it is generally agreed that AI would replace low-level skills, 
thus impacting on paralegal and junior lawyer jobs (Marr 
2018). But in the longer term, it is also agreed that AI could 
replace some high-level skilled roles currently performed by 
lawyers (Deloitte 2018).
Lawyers have a duty to provide their services compe-
tently, and, in the age of technology, they are consequently 
expected to be competent in the use of modern technologies 
(Law Society of New South Wales Commission of Inquiry 
2017, FLIP report). This then begs the question: have lawyers 
discharged such a duty if they have rendered their services 
with the assistance of technologies (such as AI) but have no 
basic understanding of how such technologies work? (Law 
Society of New South Wales Commission of Inquiry 2017, 
p. 41). Not surprisingly, the American Bar Association now 
requires, through its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
that lawyers’ duty of competency includes understanding 
changes in technology, and many states in the United States 
have now adopted a rule to this effect, requiring technology-
specific learning in continuing professional development.19 
There are also some implicit suggestions in practice notes 
issued by Australian courts (such as the Federal Court of 
Australia and the Supreme Court of Victoria) that lawyers 
are expected to have some basic understanding of technol-
ogy in a legal context, at least in terms of the application of 
technologies.20  It seems that, in the age of technology, legal 
practitioners need not only consider economic efficiency and 
productivity, they actually need to be competent in technolo-
gies. Importantly, as the FLIP Report clearly revealed, clients 
expect that technologies are used by law firms and that lawyers 
are competent and sophisticated in the use and application of 
these new technologies (Law Society of New South Wales 
Commission of Inquiry 2017, FLIP report, p. 24-26).21 
15 For a summary of these applications, see Law Society of New South Wales Commission of Inquiry (2017, ch. 5) FLIP Report.
16 For a discussion on the application of technology by government agencies, see Moses (2018). 
17 Others, however, believe that blockchain technology will be the most important technological innovation to impact various services industries. See Fenwich, Kaal and 
Vermeulen (2017, p. 263).
18 See Boran (2018), Marr (2018), Ferose and Pratt (2018).
19 The American Bar Association amended Rule 1.1 Comment of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2012 to include a competence component in relating to 
technology. It can be accessed at <https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_1_com-
petence/comment_on_rule_1_1/>.  For further discussions, see Law Society of Western Australia (2017). 
20 See, eg, Federal Court of Australia (2016). See also Horton (2017).
21 The FLIP report, while acknowledging competition and changing client expectations as other important reasons for the adoption of technologies, insists that “the most 
compelling reason for lawyers to take an interest in the technology is because the right tools optimised to a lawyer’s needs and individual practice ultimately made the 
job far more enjoyable, and far more effective and efficient” (2017, p. 31).
5 Law in context, Vol 36, Issue 1, 2019
ISSN: 1839-4183
Legal practice is not all about technical matters and skills; it 
is fundamentally about achieving justice and fairness through 
not only interpreting and applying the law, but also by advanc-
ing the law with empathy, compassion, and a strong sense of 
justice and ethics. Lawyers need to be masters, not servants, 
of technology.22  Even in interpreting and applying the law, 
technical skills and rules—the underlying mechanisms for AI 
technologies in law— are in fact rules laid down by human 
beings.23  These technologies and mechanisms create their 
own risks and limitations, and understanding these risks and 
limitations is critical for legal practice (Moses 2018).
In many ways, data analysis algorithms thus far are mostly 
advanced methods of statistics. It is human beings who con-
tinue to control what data is entered and how to interpret the 
results produced. Also important, as the Australian Human 
Rights Commission has pointed out, AI can entrench or even 
exacerbate gender bias and stereotyping (and thus inequality) 
when it is used as a tool of “predictive policing,” or other 
AI-based decision-making.24  Research has demonstrated 
that, when using AI for sentencing, black people will likely 
be treated as presenting a medium or high risk of re-offending 
(and thus be more likely to attract a custodial sentence or a 
longer sentence) because of past data suggesting that is the 
case.25  Although infringement notices, whose offences are 
relatively minor but the sanction against which accounts 
for more than 90 per cent of criminal matters, are already 
determined by algorithm in Australia  (Lansdell et al. 2012, 
Bagaric 1998) to adopt algorithms to determine sanctions 
against more serious crimes which may attract custodial sen-
tence need further considerations.26  Relying on technology 
alone can lead to injustice, whether we are dealing with big 
data or applying AI technologies. Human beings must remain 
in the driving seat. While recognising that AI systems and 
human beings have different strengths and weaknesses, only 
prudent combination with a well-designed and thoroughly 
vetted AI system to assist human decision-making may reduce 
bias in practice.27  
Further, in terms of the nature of technology, a useful 
distinction is made between automating (sustaining applica-
tions of technology) and innovating (disruptive applications 
of technology) (Law Society of New South Wales Commis-
sion of Inquiry 2017, p. 36). Simply put, automation will 
improve efficiency as well as accuracy, but innovation will 
present entirely new methods of lawyering. Neither, however, 
can be based on human experiences, nor do they “replicate 
human processes of reasoning, judgement and intuition” 
(Google ND, p. 36-41), or possess such human elements 
as the capabilities of creativity, empathy, compassion, and 
emotional intelligence (Krook 2018). That is where the limit 
of technologies lies, at least for now, and where constancy 
and change coexist. 
3. CHALENGES TO LEGAL EDUCATION
3.1 AN OVERVIEW
As discussed above, it is principally competition that has 
forced law firms to adopt and adapt to new technologies. 
Similarly, efficiency and productivity are among the major 
considerations for the application of technologies in university 
teaching and learning. Such an application is, however, only 
a small part of the challenges that universities face today. A 
much more fundamental issue is how universities will pro-
duce graduates who are capable of adapting to technology, 
but also understanding of the underlying principles of the 
applied technology. 
At the same time, however, technologies have brought 
about many previously unknown consequences that need legal 
responses. This provides opportunities for research or, more 
precisely in the current funding environment, more research 
funding opportunities. From a legal perspective, the adoption 
22 See Nussbaum et al. (2018), Kirby (2018), Krook (2018).
23 See discussions in Ashley (2017). It analysed, among other things, the implementation of different technological methods to obtain data and the use of rule-based ap-
proaches to classify statutory provisions.
24 Australian Human Rights Commission (2018, p. 7 & 28-30). See also Moses (2018, p. 360-362).
25 See Australian Human Rights Commission (2018, p. 29). The Issues Paper lists many more such examples (pp.  28–30). See also United States Government Account-
ability Office (2018).
26 Stobbs, Hunter and Bagaric (2017) have taken a favourable view on using AI in sentencing, however, they have also suggested that precaution needs to be taken and 
wide ranging and rigorous trial of the process is essential. On the other hand, Freeman (2016) has taken a very critical view on using algorithms in sentencing by the US 
courts. 
27 See for a general discussion Google (ND, p. 21-26).  
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and application of technologies and their impact on society 
also lead to the regulation of them. This naturally means 
both challenges and opportunities in teaching, research and 
global collaboration. In this sense, modern technologies truly 
present challenges as well as opportunities, and it is critically 
important that we keep in perspective that the application 
and regulation of technology are, at least at the moment, at 
the centre of our concern.
In a nutshell, technologies in legal education present us 
with three sets of considerations: the adoption and adapta-
tion of technologies to teaching and learning; the study and 
research of disruptions and other impacts of technologies in 
society to assist in laying down new laws to regulate them; 
and the preparation of future lawyers. Each of these issues 
is considered in turn. 
3.2 THE ADOPTION AND APPLICATION OF 
TECHNOLOGIES IN TEACHING AND LEARNING
We have long ago thrown away notepads and note cards. 
Nowhere can we find the old-style overhead projectors in 
classrooms these days. In their place we find computers and 
computer-linked projectors. Libraries are nowadays dominated 
by discussion rooms and work stations and, of course, the all-
important café. Books are mostly held in storage, rather than 
on bookshelves, and e-books are generally welcomed by both 
students and academics.28  These are some of the most basic 
indications of the adoption of technologies in teaching and 
learning. In fact, we have much more fundamentally changed 
the way we deliver our teaching, with blended learning, 
flipped classrooms and online delivery as typical examples 
of such changes, as well as many more other experimental 
and innovative methods of teaching delivery.29  
Law schools globally are adopting increasingly sophisti-
cated computer tools in teaching and learning.30  However, 
the application of technologies in legal education is primarily 
driven by technicians and university managers, whose prin-
cipal considerations are long-term economic efficiency and 
productivity.31   Further, one could also argue that the adoption 
of technologies meets the demands of the students who take 
a rather different path in their approach to university learning 
and in their understanding of university experiences. After 
all, “student-centred learning” seems to be the catchphrase 
in today’s higher education.
The application of technologies in teaching and learning, 
in addition to sustaining economic efficiency and productivity 
in the long run, creates opportunities and challenges. There is 
little doubt as to the benefit of massive open online courses 
(“MOOCs”) in providing opportunities to many students who 
would otherwise not be able to access legal education.32  At 
the same time, we as legal educators also grapple with many 
difficulties, and some of them challenge the assumptions of 
the purposes of education in general. 
The application of technologies, especially blended learning 
and online delivery, often leads to a major problem — that 
students stay away from campuses. The Australian Depart-
ment of Education and Training has thus conceded that, in 
its own words, “digital learning environments can result in 
lower student retention rates”  (Department of Education 
and Training 2018, p. 5). Face-to-face discussion and debate, 
interpersonal networking and socialising, extracurricular ac-
tivities (and skills), critical debate about the value of justice 
and morality, and so on — all once part of the most valuable 
university experiences — are increasingly absent from the 
learning experiences of many students. One wonders whether 
human exchanges and experiences on campus truly are time-
less values in education.
In addition, teaching law is not all about helping students 
to understand black-letter law, though it is an important part 
of legal education, it is also about inspiring students to pur-
sue a better future of the world. For thousands of years we 
have had books that cover far more knowledge than a single 
teacher or group of teachers can possibly have, but we still 
go to university. Technology can certainly change the way 
we teach and learn, and technology-aided delivery might in 
28 For discussion on e-book preference, see Library Journal (2018).
29 For some recent discussions on the use of technologies in law teaching, see Ryan (2018), Hiller (2018), Buchan, Cejnar and Katz (2018).
30 For a detailed discussion, see Binford (2014). 
31 It seems that law academics are reluctant to embrace and disinterested in embracing technology-based teaching methods. See Binford (2014, p.165–9). See also 
Canick (2014, p. 675–80), Fenwich, Kaal and Vermeulen (2017, p. 353). Although the discussion in the latter two articles is in an American context, it is largely true in 
Australia as well.
32 See the detailed discussions in Buchan, Cejnar and Katz (2018).
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fact be more engaging, but can these changes replace the 
benefit of face-to-face communication? 
It is reasonable to say that the adoption of technologies in 
teaching and learning has had mixed results, and that much 
improvement remains desirable. As Fiona McLeod SC (2018, 
p. 504), the then President of the Law Council of Australia, 
has reminded us:
I would urge that there is still a place for aural learning 
in the physical classroom. That by speaking and listening we 
use different neural pathways imbedding deep memory; deeper 
memory than by watching or distracted listening.
3.3 REGULATION OF THE USE OF TECHNOLOGIES, AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEGAL RESEARCH     
Technologies present both risks and opportunities, and 
law must respond to technological developments accordingly. 
An example that demonstrates two starkly contrasting sides 
of technology is big data and its application. The potential 
benefits of big data are obvious, and are to be welcomed. 
LexisNexis, for instance, now holds more than 60 billion 
documents and 2.5 petabytes of legal data in its data platform 
(Wilkins 2017). Access to such large databases is invaluable 
to lawyers, researchers and students. But there are other kinds 
of large databases that hold extensive personal information, 
some of which has not necessarily been collected legally or 
ethically. The personal information harvested from more 
than 80 million Facebook profiles without their permission 
by data analysis firm Cambridge Analytica is a case in point 
(Isaak and Hanna 2018). 
These databases of personal information, collected legally 
or otherwise by private companies and governments, are also 
liable to breach and the data therein misused and abused. The 
recent security breach of a medical database in Singapore is 
another example of why large databases of personal informa-
tion are of concern (Davies 2018). Here once again, the issues 
presented are multifaceted and multidimensional, complicated 
and inter-related, and ultimately have fundamental concerns 
for the protection of human rights.33  Much research is needed 
in relation to cybercrime and cyberterrorism, privacy, genetic 
profiling, online bullying, online racism, big data breaches 
and regulation, and many other areas.34  
Another disruptive technology blockchain, the invention 
which underlies cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin and smart 
contracts, has also caused great difficulties for regulators 
(Walch 2016, Fulmer 2019). As an efficient and secure tool 
which can be used to record transitions, decentralisation in 
blockchain challenges many industries as well as govern-
ment worldwide. 
In addition, developments in biomedical and bioengineering 
have presented fundamental ethical issues which are yet to 
be addressed by regulators.   The gene-edited baby claimed 
by Chinese scientist Jiankui He in late 2018 has caused out-
rage worldwide (Saey 2018). Should parents be allowed to 
choose using genome editing to prevent disease or improve 
intelligence or physical characteristics of unborn babies?35 
In other areas of controversy, such as stem cell therapies and 
cloning, most countries are yet to reach consensus and lay 
down laws to regulate them. Even technologies which have 
been around long enough and subject to regulation, such as 
genetically modified (GM) foods, or reproductive technology 
such as IVF, are still topics of ongoing public debate. We are 
not only grappling with understanding new technologies, we 
are also frequently being presented with timeless ethical ques-
tions as new technologies emerge and are applied. Can law 
really address some of the most fundamental ethical issues 
presented — is the use of those technologies playing God? 
Adding to the list are of course issues concerning equal ac-
cess to technologies as well as issues relating to the impacts 
of technology on law and legal practice.
While technologies present risks, they also present mas-
sive opportunities for research, especially for collaborative 
research internationally, as most countries would face more 
or less the same problems. Thus, just as it happened in the 
United States a few years ago (Canick 2014, p. 680), large-
scale initiatives and centres have now begun to emerge in 
Australian universities and, very encouragingly, some of these 
initiatives are in cooperation with the legal industries.36  Ad-
ditionally, technologies offer us various tools and mechanisms 
33 An excellent start to understanding the scope and depth of technological impact on society and people is Australian Human Rights Commission (2018).
34 See Australian Human Rights Commission (2018); Rule of Law Institute of Australia (2016).
35 For general discussion, see Knoepfler (2016).  
36  See, for example, UNSW Media (2017) and Ormsby (2018).
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for research, well beyond “finding the law” (Galloway 2017). 
They also promote the dissemination of knowledge, facilitate 
circulation of research results, and assist in international 
collaboration for research. Here once again, we continue to 
see constancy and change coexist without much controversy: 
we now apply new technologies to undertake research and 
disseminate results, but the fundamental purpose of research 
remains the same — that is, to advance our understanding of 
law and society through scholarship and knowledge. 
3.4	 CHALLENGES	TO	LEGAL	EDUCATION	—	
TECHNOLOGIES AND CURRICULUM DESIGN
The most fundamental and difficult challenge to legal edu-
cation is not about utilising technologies in teaching, learning 
and research, although that is useful, it is the question of how 
legal educators prepare law graduates for future practice, not 
just as lawyers but also as practitioners in law-related fields. 
This seemingly simple question is deceptively misleading; 
to answer this question, if we do not do so in a simplistic 
manner, is to reopen debate on the nature of higher education 
and the relationship between higher education and vocational 
training, between treating legal education as humanitarian 
studies and as professional training, between acquiring the 
capacity to think critically and independently and acquiring 
practical knowledge and skills; and, ultimately, the determi-
nation of the core functions of legal education. In this broad 
context, the accommodation of teaching technologies in the 
already overcrowded law curriculum is much more than a 
technical issue.
To consider any changes to law curriculum to accom-
modate technology in teaching we need to recognise that, in 
the last three decades or so, higher education in Australia has 
undergone some unprecedented changes, restructuring and 
transformation.37  These changes are frequently described 
as “intense turmoil”, “unsettling”, and as causing “crisis” 
in identity. With them are, of course, tensions, conflicts and 
uncertainties (Fitgerald 2012). 
Not very long ago we described a university (and hence 
academic work and academic identity), as an institution that 
is “autonomous, self-governing with particular privilege and 
public duties”, and governed in a collegial manner (Fitgerald 
2012, p. 2) We hold dear such values as intellectual freedom, 
autonomy, collegial authority and leadership (Fitgerald 2012, 
p. 7). It was claimed that “[i]f the disciplined pursuit of truth 
was the university’s purpose, untrammelled freedom of thought 
was its condition and lifelong tenure its guarantee.” (Manne 
2012, p.2) But we now know and have accepted that such a 
perception is largely romantic and idealised, even though, 
to a certain extent, it was practised and pursued at different 
times in history. The reality is that, since the mid-1960s, the 
non-vocational disciplines are no longer at the heart of the 
university, and humanities have become increasingly a less 
important part of the life of the academics, not by choice but 
by necessity (Manne 2012,  p. 3).
Not surprisingly, legal education in Australia in the last 
30 years or so has undergone some very significant changes, 
most vividly described by the eponymous author of the 
Pearce Report, Emeritus Professor Dennis Pearce, that “[t]
he past may have been a different country — but so is the 
future.” (Pearce 2018, p. 56) It is a story of transformation 
and one that has no end (Coper 2018, p. 4). Without going 
into detailed discussion of this transformation, suffice it to 
say that such changes have caused a “longstanding, if not 
timeless, tension between legal education as professional 
and vocational, on the one hand, and, on the other, as liberal 
and humanitarian.” (Coper 2018, p. 4).  More specifically 
these are “tensions between theory and practice, between 
general education and professional education, and between 
knowledge and skill.” (Coper 2010) 
The transformation of legal education, fundamental as it 
might be, has not changed the basic belief widely (though 
not universally) held by the legal profession in the continuing 
importance of acquisition of traditional knowledge, signified 
by the compulsory nature of the Priestley 11 subjects.38  Such 
an insistence on the knowledge-based prescription does not, 
however, prevent a quiet change in curriculum that “seeks to 
balance the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and values … 
to develop the skills of research, analysis, independent and 
critical thought, problem-solving, communication, advocacy, 
negotiation, and so on.” (Coper 2018).  At the same time, there 
is an ever increasing demand for expansion of the knowledge 
37 In fact, it is also true in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and other English-speaking jurisdictions.
38 The Priestley 11, though officially introduced in 1992, can be traced back to the 1982 McGarvie Report: Council of Legal Education Academic Course Appraisal 
Committee, “Legal Knowledge Required for Admission to Practice” (Report, Council of Legal Education 1982). See Rice (2018, p. 222).. 
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base. Indeed, for quite some time the law curriculum has been 
grappling with issues such as globalisation (hence interna-
tional and comparative perspective), sustainability, indigenous 
perspective, wellness and resilience, and gender (Galloway 
2017, p. 1-2). Adding to the list are the arguments for inclu-
sion of statutory interpretation, legal history, jurisprudence, 
experiential learning, clinical legal education, and so on.39 
This inevitably leads to competition for time and priority in 
the already crowded curriculum.
The reform of the curriculum, if any, is also complicated 
by the fact that law students come to study law for all kinds 
of different reasons with different career expectations, and 
almost half of them have no intention to practise law upon 
graduation.40  The teaching of practical skills, although not 
precisely defined,41  clearly needs to be balanced against the 
need for a generalist education, if so many students are to 
end up in careers other than legal practice.
The bottom line is: do we educate students towards becom-
ing critical and independent thinkers or towards becoming 
skillful practitioners? Can we achieve both?42  In light of the 
long list of skills demanded by the legal profession, are we 
able to teach them all? Or can we reduce these practical skills 
to the minimum essential skills such as analytic thinking, 
ethical reasoning and policy-based analysis, as suggested 
by Professor Rosalind Dixon? (quoted in Saw 2018). In the 
age of “information overload”, it is important that we keep in 
mind that our fundamental role is to shape how we understand 
and appreciate law (Edelman 2012).
If the impact of technology on law and legal practice is 
pervasive and disruptive, and the disruptive technologies 
might soon “obviate … many, if not most, of the tradi-
tional legal skills and characteristics of traditional lawyers” 
(Fenwich, Kaal and Vermeulen 2017, p. 354), then we need 
to differentiate legal skills demanded by the legal profession 
and identify new ones that our future graduates will need as 
additional skills (Perlman 2017). However, these additional 
skills will also need to be transferable and “non-automatable” 
(Department of Education and Training 2018, p. 4).  While 
machines are good at replicating knowledge and replicating 
abilities, we need to shift our learning focus to skills harder 
to be automated, such as unique human characteristics of 
empathy, leadership and integrity (AlphaBeta 2019). 
According to the Foundation for Young Australians, by 
2030 workers will spend almost 100 per cent more time at 
work solving problems, 41 per cent more time on critical 
thinking and judgement, 77 per cent more time using science 
and mathematical skills, and 17 per cent more time using 
verbal communication and interpersonal skills (Foundation 
for Young Australians 2017, p. 4). For future lawyers, they 
need to understand people, processes, experience, and security 
behind the technology to ensure that technological solutions 
actually provide values (Lat 2017), not bias or discrimination. 
One can always argue that future lawyers should be able to 
critically evaluate technology, its application and its limitations 
as well as implications, and critical evaluation is, of course, 
the traditional skill that a law school must offer. In short, it 
is not about teaching students to be technological experts, 
but teaching them to understand the principles underlying 
the technologies within a framework of a broad education 
in social science, while also equipping students with vari-
ous practical skills, including technological competency.43 
Indeed, it is strongly argued that, despite the advancement 
of technologies and the need to respond to changes brought 
about by them, traditional skills such as critical and analytical 
thinking and problem solving, and values of legal practice 
39 See discussions in Lindgren, Kunc and Coper (2018, chpt. 5).
40 See International Legal Education and Training Committee (2004, p. 9).
41 While not strictly defined, the now defunct International Legal Services Advisory Council once listed the following practical skills for law curricula: problem solving; 
legal analysis and reasoning; legal research; factual investigation; communication; counselling; negotiation; litigation and alternative dispute resolution, mediation and 
arbitration; management of legal work; recognising and resolving ethical dilemmas; drafting skills; promoting of justice and fairness; and professional development. See 
International Legal Education and Training Committee (2004, p. 8). Another good reference to skills is the 1992 MacCrate Report in the United States which outlined 
systematically the various fundamental skills, such as legal research and analysis, problem solving, communication, and court and alternative dispute resolution meth-
ods and procedures, as well as ethics: see Canick (2014), citing American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, “Legal Education and 
Professional Development — An Educational Continuum” (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, American Bar Association, July 1992).
42 The emphasis on teaching practical skills is not without controversy.  It has been argued that: “the core role of a law school is not to teach students to learn or memo-
rise hundreds of cases. Nor is it to teach our brightest students how carefully to distinguish any factual scenario before them from a decided case. Instead, the most 
important role should be for students to read far fewer cases and instead to focus much more upon history, context and theory.” (Edelman, 2012)
43 This clearly was the principal theme that emerged from the 2017 conference on legal education in Australia:  see Lindgren, Kunc and Coper (2018), a collection of 
papers presented at the Future of Australian Legal Education Conference in August 2017. 
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such as ethical propriety and social responsibility, must all 
be instilled in future lawyers. At the same time, there are 
new skills, such as emotional intelligence, digital literacy, 
teamwork and collaboration, that are demanded by the evolv-
ing legal practice (Legg 2018; Appleby, Brennan and Lynch 
2018). Here once again lies the coexistence of constancy and 
change, and contemporary skills learnt for changes are also 
to reinforce the learning of the constancy.
As already mentioned, predicting the future and the kinds 
of skills essential for the future is a risky business, but the 
needs identified above can be of assistance in guiding our 
design — or, more precisely, adjustment — of the law cur-
riculum to meet future needs. Further, it is generally agreed 
that the new skills, generally referred to as technical literacy, 
required for technology-driven society is not to undermine 
the acquisition of traditional knowledge and skills for legal 
practice (Law Society of New South Wales Commission of 
Inquiry 2017, FLIP Report, p. 77). In other words, despite 
some severe criticisms of the Priestley 11,44  we are unlikely 
to move away from this compulsory requirement, at least 
not in the near future. It is also worth pointing out that the 
demand for new skills will be on top of what have already 
been recognised as new skills for a globalised world, such as 
competency in international and comparative law.45 
Nevertheless, we need to ensure that our future legal 
practitioners will not only be capable of adapting to changing 
technologies and innovation, but will also fully understand 
the legal and ethical issues involved in the use of modern 
technologies. To understand these issues will necessarily 
demand a basic understanding of the operational principles 
of the various technologies, so as to avoid the increasingly 
common situation in which legal practitioners are asked to 
deal with issues that they do not fully understand due to rapid 
technological development (Fenwich, Kaal and Vermeulen 
2017, p. 379), or entrenching the mismatch between skills 
taught and skills needed in practice (Deloitte 2018). The 
teaching of digital literacy should be part of the teaching 
of general legal skills (Horton 2017), and any training in 
the use of legal technology will need to result in skills that 
AI will not be able to automate, such as the very “human” 
capabilities for creativity, empathy, compassion, and emo-
tional intelligence (Krook 2018). The then President of the 
Law Council of Australia, Fiona McLeod SC pointed out:
We need a basic understanding of the operations and 
language of predictive coding, computational analysis and 
“learning” and to understand the rules, assumptions and 
heuristics or bias in programming.46 
However, it would be wrong to assume that we have a 
consensus that law schools should teach these technologies. 
Some are very critical, believing our law schools might have 
failed to innovate and our existing teaching methods — teach-
ing students to apply the law to a set of facts, precisely the 
skill that is currently being automated — excludes student 
discussion on morality, emotion and empathy, the “human” 
skills that are now required (Krook 2018). Thus, one view 
argues for the complete redesign of law curriculum to “future 
proof” the future graduates (Turner 2016) and another view 
questions whether law schools are the right place to teach 
such technical skills (Saw 2018, Grady 2018)47.  Still others 
remind us that the technologies taught at the law schools 
might not be the ones that will be used by the law firms by 
the time the students graduate (Curphey 2018). There are 
also arguments that a law degree is an academic degree 
and, as such, students might be better advised to undertake 
technology courses at their practical legal training (PLT) 
stage (Hall 2017).  
As already discussed above, the present focus of many 
universities is on adopting technologies to facilitate trans-
formation of the delivery of teaching and learning content. 
While these practices will familiarise students with some 
new technologies, they are far from equipping students with 
technological competency. There is a misconception that to-
day’s students are already technologically savvy, when in fact 
44 It is characterised as overly content-based and “pedantic”, and as such, has attracted continuing debate as to whether it stifles innovation. See Coper (2018, p. 6–7). It 
is reported that the former Chief Justice of Australia Robert French once described the Priestley 11 as a “dead hand” on curriculum reform and needing urgent revision: 
see Krook (2018).
45 See the International Legal Services Advisory Council (2004). See also discussions in Coper (2012). 
46 McLeod (2018, p. 506). Others have, however, identified the capacity to work in multidisciplinary teams and with software engineers, basic coding for lawyers, basic 
mathematical principles for coded technological solutions in law, and the development of basic conceptual coding skills as necessary for future law graduates, see Fen-
wich, Kaal and Vermeulen (2017, p. 379–82).
47 Grady (2018) states  that lawyers need not to know “the intricacies of how the program worked”.
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their understanding of technology is shallow, and they lack, 
in particular, skills to evaluate sources of information and 
underlying principles in technologies (Canick 2014, p. 665).
One needs to recognise too that, for legal educators, teach-
ing technological competencies is a tall order, as few of our 
current legal academics are well acquainted themselves with 
technologies, and we are probably not required to understand 
these matters in the first place. Not surprisingly, technological 
proficiency is not considered a key outcome in legal education, 
and where technologies have been accepted, mostly warily, 
they are expected to serve the purpose of achieving traditional 
educational objectives (Canick 2014, 664). However, times 
have changed and we need to act now or otherwise we will 
be forced to do so soon. The Australian Government has an-
nounced a review of the Australian Qualifications Framework 
(“AQF”) to ensure that the AQF meets “the expectations of 
students, the education sector and the domestic and inter-
national employment markets”, including addressing the 
changing nature of work and providing the high-level skills 
and knowledge required for the future workplace (Depart-
ment of Education and Training 2018, p. 18).
In the absence of any consensus, individual law schools in 
Australia and in other countries have now begun to introduce 
some new electives, such as law apps, cyber law, computer 
coding for lawyers, cloud computing, and law-based hack-
athons, among others, and the various subjects are offered at 
both undergraduate and postgraduate levels as well as training 
modules48.   Most of the subjects are introduced in an ad hoc 
manner, and only a handful of law schools are making major 
reforms to their curriculum to prepare the future lawyers 
(Cohen 2018, Nussbaum, K 2018). The internet search results 
of Australia law schools teaching technology-based subjects 
seem to suggest that few law schools have considered the 
introduction of such subjects in light of the nature of higher 
education, the student cohort, overcrowding of the curriculum, 
and justification for the choice of a particular subject. In light 
of the fragmented and ad hoc practice among Australian law 
schools we might ask: if technical competency is a question 
of competency in discharging lawyer’s duties, should such 
a subject be made a compulsory or core subject in the law 
curriculum? (Law Society of New South Wales Commission 
of Inquiry 2017, FLIP Report, p. 78)
In the context of Australian legal education, a most 
comprehensive argument for teaching law technology in 
Australia is mounted by Kate Galloway, a prolific writer on 
legal technology from Bond University. Galloway argues 
for a whole of curriculum approach (or what she calls an 
“immersion approach”) to digital literacy, and urges legal 
educators to consider digital technologies in the broader 
context of the law (Galloway 2017, p. 2). Her argument is 
essentially technology-driven, arguing for digital technolo-
gies to be embedded within teaching and learning — that 
is, for them to be integrated into all law subjects (Galloway 
2017, p. 15). This seems to be a rather idealistic approach, 
echoing an earlier argument for an integration-based ap-
proach to globalisation of law and legal education (Office of 
Learning and Teaching 2012, pp. 79-82). While it is true that 
there should be no limit to the broader contexts of the law 
(Galloway 2017, p. 3), it is nevertheless doubtful whether 
such an approach is also practical. As discussed above, there 
has been an increasing demand for inclusion of the various 
subject matters in the law curriculum and, although each has 
been argued for embedment in the law curriculum, none can, 
to this day, claim to have been so integrated. In this context, 
legal technology is just one of the latest demands for inclu-
sion, albeit the one having the most radical impact on law 
and legal practice. Further, such an approach assumes that 
the legal academics are not only willing, but also digitally 
literate, or could easily become digitally literate. 
While we strongly believe that there is a need to teach law 
students about some technical issues, we also recognise the 
need to have such teaching accommodated within the existing 
Priestley 11-dominated curriculum. More importantly, perhaps, 
despite the technological changes, there are certain constant 
values in higher education, such as critical and independent 
thinking, interpersonal communication and negotiation skills, 
and adherence to ethical practice. These fundamental values 
need to be coupled to an understanding of technological 
48 Internet search by the author suggests that no fewer than twelve Australian law schools are currently offering law technology subjects in various forms. For further 
descriptions of and discussions on legal technology teaching in Australian law schools, see FLIP Report (2017, p. 78), Lambert (2016), Taylor (undated). For discus-
sions on law technology teaching in selected law schools in Australia, see Lindgren, Kunc and Coper (2018, chpt VI). For a discussion of law technology courses in the 
United States see: Canick (2014, p. 680–1), Perlman (2017). For a summary of law technology courses offered in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe, see 
Singleton-Clift (2017). For a discussion on international recognition of the importance in teaching law technology, see Thanaraj (2017).
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development and the underlying principles of technology; 
skills learnt from the latter will then reinforce the learning, 
and assist in the application of the fundamental values. With 
this rationale, we believe that the “conventional” Priestley 
11-led curriculum should refocus on fundamental values in 
legal education through the teaching of the curriculum in a 
broad social science context (Nussbaum, M 2018). With this 
reorientation to teaching the constancies, we should then in-
troduce two technology subjects that deal with changes. We 
would imagine a “law and technology” subject to introduce 
law students to an understanding of the ever-evolving new 
technologies, and another subject on “coding for lawyers” to 
explain to students the underlying principles of coding and 
algorithms. These two subjects would not produce special-
ists in technology, but graduates who would be confident 
in technology as well as fully aware of the limitations and 
potential biases in the products of technologies such as big 
data and AI. We do not think there would be any particular 
harm if this was made compulsory in the law curriculum.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We should recognise that changes brought about by the 
development of science and technology are a fixed feature 
of legal development in all legal systems.49  In this sense, the 
topic of law and technology is in fact not new, nor should it 
be as frightening as it seems to be. 
We should, however, also recognise that the current round 
of technological impact on law and legal education is massive 
and developing extremely rapidly. We have never faced any 
more severe challenges until now, and what we are witnessing 
at the moment is only the beginning of it. Indeed, modern 
technologies, especially AI and big data, have presented us 
the biggest challenges. In this sense, the future could look 
daunting, but it could also be promising. 
In responding to such changes, we must not lose sight of 
the fundamental mission of higher education; that is, “higher 
education is about cultivating knowledge and analytical skills 
that can be of enormous value well beyond the workplace—and 
encouraging wide-ranging intellectual enquiry” (Universities 
Australia 2018, p. 12). Learning to effectively use technol-
ogy is to ensure that future graduates will be technologically 
confident and proficient, but a law graduate is not, nor needs 
to be, an expert in technology. We should also recognise that 
nothing can be future-proof, as we do not know exactly how 
technology will develop and what kind of impact any new 
developments might make. However, there are values and 
skills that are more endurable and more capable of adapta-
tion than others, and such values and skills are the ones that 
machines lack until now, such as critical analysis. 
Law, after all, is a human science that demands a “human 
touch”, and that calls for human values and empathy, in addition 
to rationale and reason, and none of which can be replaced 
by machines. As such, it is premature to pronounce the death 
of legal practice or legal education. In fact, common law has 
always been an evolving system that adapts to changing times. 
The common law system has proven, time and again, that it 
is capable of preserving the “skeleton of principles” while 
adapting to contemporary issues and demands.
The same can be said about legal education, which is a 
reflective, flexible and constantly changing system. Like the 
way legal education adapted to globalisation, legal education 
will meet new technological challenges and, as such, there 
is no reason to believe that there is not a bright future for 
legal education and the legal profession, even though our 
future could indeed be thrills and spills, and it is reasonable 
to believe that we will continue to make use of technologies 
as we have done so for decades, not that technology will 
make use of us. 
5. REFERENCES1. AlphaBeta, 2019. Future Skills. Report prepared by Alpha-Beta for Google Australia. https://www.alphabeta.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/google-skills-report.pdf. Accessed 20/04/19. 2. American Bar Association Commission on the Future of Legal Services, 2016. Report on the Future of Legal Services 
in the United States. Report. https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf. Accessed 22/6/18. 3. Anleu, S. L. R. 1991. “Women in the Legal Profession: Theory 
and Research.” https://aic.gov.au/sites/default/files/publi-cations/proceedings/.../16-anleu.pdf. Accessed 08/07/18. 
49 As early as the 1960s, legal educators were asking how law and legal education might respond to the exponential growth in scientific knowledge during the modern 
era: see, eg, Miller (1967, p. 29-39).
13 Law in context, Vol 36, Issue 1, 2019
ISSN: 1839-4183
4. Appleby, G., Brennan, S., and Lynch, A. 2018. “Keep Calm and Carry on: Why the Increasing Automation of Legal Services 
Should Deepen and Not Diminish Legal Education.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc, M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian 
Legal Education, Sydney: Thomson Reuters. 5. Ashley, K.D. 2017. Artificial Intelligence and Legal Analytics: 
New Tools for Law Practice in the Digital Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Australian Human Rights Commission, 2018. Human Rights 
and Technology, Issues Paper, 24 July. 7. Bagaric, M. 1998. “Instant Justice? The Desirability of Ex-panding the Range of Criminal Offences Dealt with on the 
Sport.” Monash University Law Review, 24 (2): 231-271.8. Binford, W. H. 2014. “Envisioning a Twenty-First Century 
Legal Education.” Washington University Journal of Law 
and Policy, 43: 157-186. 9. Boran, M. 2018. “Making a Case for Artificial Intelligence 
in the Legal Profession.” The Irish Times, Webpage, 21 June. https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/
making-a-case-for-artificial-intelligence-in-the-legal-profes-sion-1.3533815. Accessed 22/7/18.10. Buchan, J., Cejnar L., and Katz, S. 2018. “Equity, Diversity and Inclusion through Online Learning: Using a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) to Facilitate Acquisition of 
Specialist Legal Knowledge.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian Legal Education. 
Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 441–56.11. Canick, S. 2014. “Infusing Technology Skills into the Law 
School Curriculum.” Capital University Law Review, 42 (3): 663-708. 12. Cohen, M. A. 2018. “Technology: Law's Collaborative Cata-
lyst.” Forbes, 26 February.  https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2018/02/26/technology-laws-collaborative-
catalyst/#49b439fb6952. Accessed 22/7/18. 13. College of Law, 2018. “Four Big Predictions for the Legal 
Profession in 2018.” College of Law News & Insights, 10 January. https://www.collaw.edu.au/news/2018/01/08/four-big-predictions-for-the-legal-profession-in-2018. Ac-cessed 22/5/18.14. Coper, M. 2018. “Introduction and Overview.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian Legal 
Education. Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 1-24. 15. Coper, M. 2010. Recent Developments in Australian Legal 
Education. Research Paper No 10-85, Australian National University College of Law, 6 November. https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1715262. Accessed 22/6/18.
16. Coper, M. 2012. “Ten Elements of the Internationalisation 
of Legal Education.” ANU College of Law, Research Paper No.13-18. 17. Curphey, A. 2018. “Teaching Legal Tech? Forget the Tech.” 
Artificial Lawyer, 25 May.   https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/05/25/teaching-legal-tech-forget-the-tech-adam-curphey-bpp-law-school/. Accessed 22/7/18.18. Davis, A.R. 2017. “Rage against the Machines: Artificial Intel-
ligence and the Future of Legal Practice”, Thomson Reuters 
Legal Insight, 15 December. http://insight.thomsonreuters.
com.au/posts/artificial-intelligence-future-legal-practice. Accessed 18/8/18.19. Davies, J. 2018. “Hackers Breach 1.5 million Singapore Pa-
tient Records, Including the Prime Minister’s.” Healthcare IT 
News, 20 July. https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hackers-breach-15-million-singapore-patient-records-including-prime-ministers. Accessed 10/9/18.20. Deloitte, 2016. Developing Legal Talent: Stepping into the 
Future Law Firm. Report, February 2016. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/audit/deloitte-uk-developing-legal-talent-2016.pdf. Ac-cessed 22/7/18.21. Department of Education and Training, 2018. Submis-
sion No 141 to Senate Select Committee on the Future of 
Work and Workers. 2 March, 2018. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Fu-ture_of_Work_and_Workers/FutureofWork/Submissions. Accessed 27/8/18.22. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Commit-tees/Senate/Future_of_Work_and_Workers/FutureofWork/Submissions. Accessed 20/5/19.23. Donahue, L. 2018. “A Primer on Using Artificial Intelligence 
in the Legal Profession.” JOLT Digest Webpage, 3 January. https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-primer-on-using-
artificial-intelligence-in-the-legal-profession. Accessed 18/8/18.24. Edelman, J. 2012. “Problems for a Law Curriculum in the 
21st Century.” Speech delivered at the Roundtable of the 
Australian Academy of Law”, Perth, 19 September.25. Federal Court of Australia. 2016.  Practice Note GPN-TECH — Technology and the Court, 25 October. http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/law-and-practice/practice-documents/practice-notes/gpn-tech. Accessed 12/9/1826. Fenwich, M., Kaal, W.A., and  Vermeulen, E.P.M. 2017. “Legal 
Education in the Blockchain Revolution.” Vanderbilt Journal 
of Entertainment and Technology Law, 20 (2): 351-387.
Law in context, Vol 36, Issue 1, 2019  14
ISSN: 1839-4183
27. Ferose, V.R. and Pratt, L. 2018. “How AI Is Disrupting the 
Law.” Digitalist Magazine, 3 April.  https://www.digitalist-mag.com/digital-economy/2018/04/03/ai-is-disrupting-law-06030693. Accessed 18/8/18.28. Fitzgerald, T. 2012. “Tracing the Fault Lines.” In T. Fitzgerald, J. White and H. M. Gunter (eds.), Hard Labour? Academic 
Work and Changing Landscape of Higher Education. Emer-ald, IPHE, pp. 1-22. https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/10.1108/s1479-3628%282012%297. Accessed 10/8/18.29. Foundation for Young Australians, 2017. The New Work 
Smarts: Thriving in the New Work Order Report. https://www.fya.org.au/wp-ontent/uploads/2017/07/FYA_The-NewWorkSmarts_July2017.pdf. Accessed 22/7/18.30. Freeman, K. 2016. “Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Project Due Process Rights in State 
v. Loomis.” North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 18: 75-106. 31. Fulmer, N. 2019. “Exploring the Legal Issues of Blockchain 
Applications.” Akron Law Review, 52 (1): 161-192.  32. Galloway, K. 2017. “A Rationale and Framework for Digital 
Literacies in Legal Education.” Legal Education Review 27 (1): 15-17.33. Grady, K. 2016. “What ‘Teaching Legal Tech’ Could Mean: 
The Balance between Going Too Far and Not Far Enough.” 
The Algorithmic Society, 30 April. https://medium.com/the-algorithmic-society/what-teaching-legal-tech-could-mean-bf31cf0d4d10. Accessed 22/7/18.34. Goodman, J. 2016. Robots in Law: How Artificial Intelligence 
Is Transforming Legal Services. Lmdon: ARK Group.35. Google, ND. Perspectives on Issues in AI Governance. Report, Google. https://ai.google/perspectives-on-issues-in-AI-governance/. Accessed 20/04/19.36. Hall, R. 2017. “Ready for Robot Lawyers? How Students 
Can Prepare For the Future of Law.” The Guardian, 31 July. https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jul/31/ready-for-robot-lawyers-how-students-can-prepare-for-the-future-of-law. Accessed 22/7/18.37. Hiller, S. 2018. “Flipping the Chalk and Talk with Law stu-dents On and Off Line: The Advantage of Transformative 
Pedagogy Utilising Technology.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian Legal Education, 
Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 429–39. 38. Horton, F. 2017. “Tech Competency: A New Standard.” 91 (9) 
Law Institute Journal 47 https://www.liv.asn.au/Staying-Informed/LIJ/LIJ/September-2017/Tech-Competency--A-New-Standard. Accessed 17/8/18
39. International Legal Technology Association, 2018. ILTA’s 2018 
Technology Survey, conducted by Todd Corham. https://www.
iltanet.org/resources/publications/surveys/2018ts?ssopc=1 Accessed 10/05/19. 40. International Legal Education and Training Committee, International Legal Services Advisory Council, Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth of Australia. 2004. 
Internationalisation of the Australian Law Degree.  Report, June.41. Isaak, J. and Hanna, M. J. 2018. “User Data Privacy: Facebook, 
Cambridge Analytica, and Privacy Protection.” Computer, 51( 8): 56-59. 42. Kirby, M. 2018. “Closing Thought.” In K.Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian Legal Educa-
tion, Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 509–19. 43. Knoepfler, P. 2016. GMO Sapiens: The Life-Changing Science 
of Designer Babies. World Scientific, Singapore.44. Krook, J. 2018. “Teaching Law Students Creative Skills Could 
Save the Profession from Automation.” The Conversation, 21 June. http://theconversation.com/teaching-law-students-creative-skills-could-save-the-profession-from-automa-tion-97615. Accessed 22/9/18.45. Lambert, J. 2016. “Technology in Legal Education.” In Law 
in Order, 2 September. https://www.lawinorder.com.au/blog/august-2016/technology-in-legal-education. Ac-cessed 22/9/18.46. Lansdell, G., Eriksson, A., Saunders, B., and Brown, M. 2012. 
“Infringement Systems in Australia: A precarious Blurring 
of Civil and Criminal Sanctions?”  Alternative Law Journal 37 (1): 41-45.47. Lat, D. 2017. “4 Trends Shaping the Future of the Legal 
Profession.” Above the Law, 5 October. https://abovethelaw.com/2017/10/4-trends-shaping-the-future-of-the-legal-profession/. Accessed 8/7/18. 48. Law Society of Western Australia, 2017. The Future of the 
Legal Profession. Report, 12 December. https://www.lawso-cietywa.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2017DEC12-Law-Society-Future-of-the-Legal-Profession.pdf. Accessed 22/7/1849. Law Society of New South Wales Commission of Inquiry, 2017. The Future of Law and Innovation in the Profession. 
Report (“FLIP Report”). https://www.lawsociety.com.au/
sites/default/files/2018-03/1272952.pdf. Accessed 22/7/18.50. Leary, K. 2018. “The Verdict Is In: AI Outperforms Human 
Lawyers in Reviewing Legal Documents.” Futurism, 27 February. https://futurism.com/ai-contracts-lawyers-
lawgeex/ Accessed 18/8/18.
15 Law in context, Vol 36, Issue 1, 2019
ISSN: 1839-4183
51. Legg, M. 2018. “New Skills for New Lawyers: Responding 
to Technology and Practice Developments.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian Legal 
Education, Sydney:  Thomson Reuters, pp. 373–88. 52. Library Journal, 2018. Academic Student Ebook Experience 
Survey 2018. Report.  https://mediasource.formstack.com/
forms/2018_academic_student_ebook_experience_sur-vey_report Accessed 8/5/19.53. McLeod, F. 2018.  “Looking to the Future of Legal Educa-
tion.” a speech delivered at the Australian Academy of Law Conference, Sydney, 13 August 2017. Published in Nuss-baum, M. C., Robertson, A., McLeod, F., and Traevanion, D. 
2018. “Four Perspectives on the Future of Australian Legal 
Education.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc, M. Coper (eds), The 
Future of Australian Legal Education, Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 503-507 . 54. Manne, R. 2012. “The University Experience—Then and 
Now.” The Conversation, Melbourne, 19 October, http://theconversation.com/the-university-experience-then-and-now-10135 Accessed 22/7/18.55. Marr, B. 2018. “How AI And Machine Learning Are Trans-
forming Law Firms And The Legal Sector.” Forbes, 23 May. https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/23/how-ai-and-machine-learning-are-transforming-law-firms-and-the-legal-sector/#3a9b7ecb32c3 Accessed 22/4/19.56. Miller, A.S.  1967.  “Science and Legal Education.” Case 
Western Reserve Law Review, 19 (1): 29-39. 57. Monahan, J., and Skeem, J. 2015. “Risk Assessment in Criminal 
Sentencing, Annual Review of Clinical Psychology.”, Virginia 
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 2015, 53. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662082  Accessed 23/04/19. 58. Moses, L. B. 2018. “The Need for Lawyers.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds), The Future of Australian Legal 
Education. Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 364-365.59. Neuburger, J. 2017. “Reflections on Technology-Related Le-gal Issues: Looking Back at 2017; Will 2018 Be a Quantum 
Leap Forward?” In Proskauer, New Media and Technology 
Law Blog, 20 December. https://newmedialaw.proskauer.
com/2017/12/20/reflections-on-technology-related-legal-issues-looking-back-at-2017-will-2018-be-a-quantum-leap-forward/ Accessed 8/5/18.60. Nussbaum, M. C., Robertson, A., McLeod, F., and Traevanion, 
D. 2018. “Four Perspectives on the Future of Australian 
Legal Education.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian Legal Education. Sydney: 
Thomson Reuters, pp. 497–508.
61. Nussbaum, M. C. 2018. “Why Lawyers Need a Broad Social 
Education.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc, M. Coper (eds.), The 
Future of Australian Legal Education. Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 27-45.  62. Nussbaum, K. 2018. “Innovation in Legal Education.” Above 
the Law. Webpage, 27 February. https://abovethelaw.com/2018/02/innovating-in-legal-education/ Accessed 8/4/19.63. Office of Learning and Teaching, Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education, 
2012. “Internationalising the Australian Law Curriculum 
for Enhanced Global Legal Practice.” Final Report, De-partment of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education.  64. Ormsby, G. 2018. “KWM, KPMG and UNSW Collaborate to 
Disrupt and Innovate.” Lawyers Weekly,  31 August. https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/biglaw/23931-kwm-kpmg-and-unsw-collaborate-to-disrupt-and-innovate  Accessed 22/4/1965. Pearce, D. 2018. “The Past Is a Different Country.” In K. Lind-gren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian 
Legal Education, Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 2018, pp. 49-56. 66. Perlman, A. 2018. “Predicting the Future of Legal Services.” 
Remaking Law Firms, 1 February. https://remakinglawfirms.com/predicting-future-legal-services/ Accesed 22/4/19. 67. Perlman, A. 2017. “Legal Education in the 21st Century.” 
Remaking Law Firms, 10 March. https://remakinglawfirms.com/legal-education-21st-century/ Accessed 22/7/18.68. Rayo, E. A. 2017. “AI in Law and Legal Practice — A Com-
prehensive View of 35 Current Applications”, Emerj, 28 November. https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/ai-in-law-legal-practice-current-applications/  Accessed 18/8/18.69. Rice, S. 2018. “Why Prescriptive Legal Education Demands 
Critical Perspective.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds), The Future of Australian Legal Education. Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 217-228.   70. Rule of Law Institute of Australia, 2016. Topics for Con-
temporary Issue Assignment: The Individual and Technol-
ogy, 20 June. https://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-06-20-Cyber-crime-Privacy-
MetadataGenetic-Profiling-Cyber-Bullying.pdf Accessed 22/4/19. 71. Ryan, P. 2018. “Exploring the Use of Artificial Intelligence 
to Improve Law Students’ Self-Assessment.” In K. Lindgren, F. Kunc and M. Coper (eds.), The Future of Australian Legal 
Education, Sydney: Thomson Reuters, pp. 401–27. 
Law in context, Vol 36, Issue 1, 2019  16
ISSN: 1839-4183
72. Saey, T. H. 2018. “News of the first gene-edited babies 
ignited a firestorm.” ScienceNews, 17 December. https://www.sciencenews.org/article/gene-edited-babies-top-science-stories-2018-yir. Accessed 25/04/19.73. Saw, Y. 2018. “Putting Technology in Its Place: Are Law 
Schools the Right Place to Teach Coding?” Thomson Reuters 
Legal Insight, 21 March. http://insight.thomsonreuters.com.au/posts/law-schools-teach-coding. Accessed 22/4/19.74. Singleton-Clift, F. 2017. “Our Complete List of Legal Tech 
Courses”. Clocktimizer, 12 July. https://www.clocktimizer.com/legal-tech-university-courses. Accessed 22/4/19.  75. Stobbs, N., Hunter, D., Bagaric, M. 2017. “Can Sentencing Be 
Enhanced by the Use of Artificial Intelligence?” Criminal 
Law Journal 41(5): 261-277.76. Susskind, R. 2013. Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction 
to Your Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A second edition of the book was published in 2017.77. Susskind, R., Susskind, D. 2015. The Future of the Profes-
sions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of Human 
Experts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.78. Taylor, S. ND. “Top Trends in Legal Innovation—A Law 
Student’s Guide to their Future Workplace” on Beyond Law https://beyondlaw.com.au/news/105-top-trends-in-legal-innovation-a-law-student-s-guide-to-their-future-workplace. Accessed 22/4/19.79. Thanaraj, A. 2017. “Making the Case for a Digital Lawyering 
Framework in Legal Education.” International Review of 
Law (17) 1: 1-21. https://www.lawsociety.com.au/sites/
default/files/2018-04/NATIONAL%20PROFILE%20OF%20SOLICITORS%202016.compressed.pdf. Accessed 22/4/19
80. Turner, S. 2016. “We Must Redesign Legal Education for 
Better Tomorrow.” LegalTrek, 18 October. https://legaltrek.com/blog/2016/10/we-must-redesign-legal-education-for-better-tomorrow/. Accessed 8/8/1881. United States Government Accountability Office, 2018. Report 
to the Committee on Science, Space and Technology. GAO-18-142SP, March, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690910.pdf. Accessed 22/4/19.82. Universities Australia, 2018. Submission to Business Council of Australia. Future Proof Consultation 23 Janu-ary. https://www.bca.com.au/future_proof_submissions. Accessed 22/5/19. 83. UNSW Media, 2017. New Innovation and Technology Hub 
to Tackle the Future of Law and the Legal Profession. Media Release, 24 November. https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/business-law/new-innovation-and-technology-hub-tackle-future-law-and-legal-profession. Accessed 22/4/19. 84. Vogl, R. 2016. “The Coming of Age of Legal Technology.” 
Stanford Lawyer, 26 September. https://law.stanford.edu/2016/09/26/184188/. Accessed 17/8/18.85. Walch, A. 2019. “The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and 
the Law).” Review of Banking and Financial Law, 36 (2): 713-766. 86. Winick, E. 2017. “Lawyer-Bots Are Shaking up Jobs.” MIT 
Technology Review, 12 December. https://www.technolo-gyreview.com/s/609556/lawyer-bots-are-shaking-up-jobs. Accessed 22/4/19. 87. Wilkins, S. 2017. “The AI Revolution Disrupting the Legal 
Sector.” Lawyers Weekly, 26 October.  https://www.law-yersweekly.com.au/newlaw/22140-the-ai-revolution-disrupting-the-legal-sector Accessed 22/4/19.
